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Introduction 
The concept of customary law is a fascinating research topic.
1 There is no other source of inter-
national law that has been subject to an equally intensive scholarly debate. Yet, many aspects of 
the formation of customary law still remain a mystery,
2 and one has the impression that there is 
little methodological guidance underlying the identification of customary norms. One of the as-
pects where this is particularly obvious is the question of how much state practice is needed for 
the formation of a customary norm. There are two competing schools of thought that stress dif-
ferent characteristics of a customary norm.
3 Some scholars stress the practice requirement and 
see customary norms as crystallization points of patterns of state behavior,
4 while others focus on 
opinio iuris and perceive customary law as a type of tacit agreement,
5 which can only bind those 
who have consented to it.
6 
In practice, however, we see a mixture of both positions, which creates certain tensions. Custom-
ary norms can, on the one hand, be formed without the explicit consent of each individual state 
being necessary. The identification of a customary norm only requires the observation of a gen-
eral and consistent pattern of state conduct.
7 States can thus also be bound if they were simply 
inactive during the phase of the formation of the customary rule or if they were not yet in exist-
ence.
8 On the other hand, every state has the opportunity to opt out of a specific customary norm 
if it explicitly objects to its formation and can thus be considered as a persistent objector,
9 which 
can only be explained from a voluntarist standpoint focusing on consent. 
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According to this interpretation of customary law, there is thus one decisive difference between 
obligations imposed by treaty and those stemming from custom. Treaty law is an opt-in system. 
You are only part of the legal regime if you have explicitly consented. Custom, in contrast, is an 
opt-out system. States are bound by customary rules unless they explicitly object to their for-
mation. Despite this difference, there is one common denominator: In principle, a state cannot be 
bound by a customary norm against its will. The justification for this rule is the Lotus principle, 
according to which states can only be bound by a legal norm if they have consented to it.
10 The 
Lotus principle thus establishes a freedom of action for states.
11 Unlike in domestic democratic 
systems, where individual freedom can be restrained by majority decisions of a representative 
body, there is no majoritarian decision making mechanism in international law that could restrain 
the freedom of a state against the will of its representatives. 
This contribution analyzes the role of consent in the formation of customary law. It will chal-
lenge the assumption that customary norms cannot bind states against their will. Relying on 
game theory, it will distinguish between different situations and argue that the role of consent 
differs according to the structure of the social problem that a potential norm is supposed to ad-
dress. We will approach the topic in two steps. First, there will be a short review of the academic 
literature on the issue of consent in the formation of customary norms (1.). Second, I will pro-
pose a taxonomy of three different situations and propose individual solutions for each of these 
situations (2.). 
1.   The Discussion in the Legal Doctrine 
When we look at state practice, we might observe three different types of state conduct with re-
spect to a specific customary rule. States may affirm the legal rule through their practice, they 
may abstain from any relevant action, or they may explicitly oppose the formation of the legal 
rule. If we ask for the amount of consent that is necessary for the emergence of a customary rule, 
this question can be interpreted in two different ways. First, we can perceive it as a voting rule. If 
the amount of positive state practice reaches a specific threshold, the emerging customary norm 
does not only bind all affirming and abstaining states, but even those that are opposed to the 
formation of the norm.
12 
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However, considerations about quotas of consent are, secondly, equally important from a per-
spective according to which customary law is an opt-out system. Even if persistently objecting 
states are not bound by a customary rule, we have to determine the amount of positive state prac-
tice that is necessary to bind at least those states that have abstained from any relevant action. 
How much explicit consent do we need for a customary rule to emerge? Where is the tipping 
point at which objections by states do not merely make them persistent objectors, but are an ob-
stacle to the emergence of a norm itself?
13 Finally, do all states have an equal weight in the for-
mation of customary law, or does the practice of some states count more than the practice of oth-
ers? 
The issue that has so far received the most attention in legal scholarship is the question of wheth-
er the practice of all states should be considered equally. Here, we have to distinguish two poten-
tial versions of weighting state practice. On the one hand, we have to determine a necessary level 
of positive practice for a customary rule to emerge. A positive practice of three states is in most 
cases not sufficient to create a customary norm even if there is no contradicting state practice or 
protests by other states. In this context, weighting of state practice means that the number of 
states necessary for positively performing a certain conduct depends on the states that actually do 
participate. On the other hand, we might consider giving different weight to the practice of dif-
ferent states, even in situations where we observe a contradicting state practice. The weighting 
would then deviate from the consensus requirement and have the function of a voting rule.
14 
There is a general sense in legal scholarship that the practice of states should not always be 
weighted equally. Many authors claim, in particular, that greater weight should be given to states 
that are especially affected.
15 The idea seems to be intuitive at first glance. If we consider, for 
instance, a rule of the law of the sea, then it is plausible that the practice of land-locked countries 
has less of an influence on the formation of a customary rule. In other words: states that have no 
stakes in the game should, in principle, not be considered. That means that the number of states 
necessary for the establishment of a state practice depends on the number of states that actually 
have an interest in this particular area. There are thus different standards for space law than for 
the law of diplomatic relations. 
As far as the weighting concerns the necessary level of positive state practice, it seems plausible 
or even necessary. It may be highly problematic, however, if we perceive it as a voting mecha-
nism.
16 Not all cases are as easy as the one of land-locked countries. If states have some interest 
in a matter and express this interest through a divergent state practice, it will be difficult to de-
termine the states that are especially affected by a certain subject matter. The same is valid for 
                                        
13   See Elias, supra note 9, at para. 2-6. 
14   See Charney, supra note 9, at 19 (arguing in favor of a weighted majority vote).  
15   Richard R. Baxter, Treaties and Custom, 129 Recueil des Cours 25, 66 (1970); Wolfke, supra note 6, at 78; 
Anthoy Clark Arend, Legal Rules and International Society 92-93 (1999). See also North Sea Continental 
Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 42 (Feb. 20), at para. 74 (emphasizing the state practice of specially af-
fected states in its analysis of state practice). The idea is framed slightly differently by Anthony D’Amato, 
The Concept of Custom in International Law 96-97 (1971), who attributes different weight to the degree of 
the state’s “sophistication” in international law. 
16   Michael Akehurst, Custom as a Source of International Law, 47 Brit. Yb. Int’l L. 1, 22 (1974).  4
the proposal to give more weight to the practice of large and powerful states.
17 This may again 
be a useful tool to determine whether the necessary threshold of positive state practice is met, but 
it does not work as a voting rule because there might be pronounced and systematic differences 
of interest between larger and smaller states. 
There is no clear-cut rule proposed in the international jurisprudence or in the international legal 
doctrine of how much consent or how much consistent state practice are necessary for the for-
mation of customary law.
18 The reason for this vagueness is the structure of the problem. The 
more clear-cut rules are, the more likely it is that they are either over- or underinclusive.
19 This is 
especially the case if the reality they are meant to govern is complex, as a complex reality cannot 
be grasped by simple rules. If we said that we always needed at least the practice of x states for 
the formation of a customary norm, this rule would not take into account that there are areas, 
such as space law, in which only very few states are able to perform a practice to start with. Fur-
thermore, if we require a simple majority of states, we might not be able to take into account dif-
ferences in the size and the political importance of a state. Furthermore, there might be a differ-
ence between a strong and a weak confirmation of state practice. Do we count them the same 
way? Or do we have to differentiate? If we differentiate, how much weight do we concede to a 
weak confirmation of state practice? These illustrations show that the formation of customary 
law is a complex exercise that needs to leave some flexibility to the lawyer interpreting instances 
of state practice and assigning legal significance to them. 
Therefore, I will not be able to give any clear rules of interpretation in this contribution. I can 
only give some guidelines. In particular, I want to second guess the consensus principle underly-
ing the theory of customary international law – the dogma that states cannot be bound by a rule 
of customary international law against their will.
20 In his recent book, Brian Lepard has advocat-
ed the introduction of a majority rule when it comes to the evaluation of contradicting state prac-
tice.
21 In this context, he differentiates between different game-theoretical incentive structures.
22 
According to Lepard, pure coordination problems require a lower level of consensus than a pris-
oners’ dilemma situation. I will try to show in the following that the approach to differentiate 
according to the structure of the problem is accurate. However, I will propose some crucial mod-
ifications with regard to the treatment of the different situations. 
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2.   Different standards depending on the structure of the game 
The rationale of the Lotus principle is the idea that every society should be the master of its own 
fate. It corresponds to the basic liberal principle that “[f]reedom (independence from being con-
strained by another's choice), insofar as it can coexist with the freedom of every other in accord-
ance with a universal law, is the only original right belonging to every man by virtue of his hu-
manity”
23, which is one of the cornerstones of the philosophy of the Enlightenment. However, 
there is one important restriction to Kant’s dictum, quoted above. Freedom is not unlimited, but 
can only be exercised as long as it does not come into conflict with the freedom of other actors of 
the legal order. There may be situations in which the exercise of one state’s freedom restricts the 
freedom of another legal subject. In such situations, the Lotus principle does not help us to solve 
the problem in the abstract because we have conflicting claims based on the freedom of action.
24 
I believe that we have to differentiate between three different situations. The first concerns the 
preservation of common goods. In these situations, contributing to the common good would be 
the socially optimal solution. However, everyone has an individual incentive not to contribute 
(a.). Secondly, we will consider norms of coordination. In game-theoretical terms, such situa-
tions have multiple equilibria. States thus have to coordinate on one particular equilibrium. 
However, the choice of the concrete equilibrium does not make any difference from a social 
point of view (b.). The third situation refers to ethical values, which are – in this contribution – 
understood as rules or principles that do not protect the interests of a particular state, but of third 
entities, such as individual human beings (c.).  
a.   Common Goods and the Prisoners’ Dilemma 
In the context of this contribution, common goods shall be understood as all goods whose provi-
sion or maintenance causes externalities.
25 The most important common good is a pure public 
good that is characterized by non-rivalry of consumption and non-excludability of benefits.
26 
Non-rivalry of consumption means that the quality of the good is not affected by the number of 
people using it. Goods are non-excludable if nobody can be physically excluded from using the 
good. The classical example is the provision of national defense. The military is not more or less 
effective if it has to protect more people. Furthermore, people cannot be excluded from the bene-
fit of defense even if they do not want to share it. However, pure public goods do not occur often 
in practice. But there are a number of impure public goods, which are characterized by partial 
non-rivalry and/or partial non-excludability.
27 The most important subcategory for our purposes 
is common pool resources, whose main characteristic is non-excludability. Examples for com-
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mon pool resources in the international arena are the protection of the global climate or the 
preservation of fish stocks. 
The problem with common goods is that the benefit of the use of these resources is private, while 
the costs are social.
28 If we consider clean air as a common good, driving a car yields private 
benefits for the driver of the car, while the costs – the pollution of the air – have to be borne by 
everyone and are thus socialized. The incentive structure of the provision or maintenance of 
common goods typically is that of an n-dimensional prisoners’ dilemma.
29 Individuals have a 
private incentive to use the resources beyond the level that would be socially optimal. 
For an example, let us assume an international society with four states. Each state can either de-
cide to make use of a certain contaminating industry or not to use it. The use of the industry 
would yield a private benefit of three for that particular state, while yielding social costs of four 
because of air pollution, which have to be equally borne by all four states. From a global per-
spective, the best decision would be not to use the industry because a benefit of three and costs 
of four add up to a negative number. Privately, however, every state has an incentive to use the 
contaminating industry, because it bears just one unit of the total social costs, so that it has a pri-
vate benefit of two. The best of all worlds for one state would thus be the one where it is the only 
state to make use of its contaminating industry, while all the others refuse to do so in order to 
protect the environment. But even if all other states make use of their contaminating industries, it 
is still individually rational for the fourth state to make use of its industry as well (see table 1). It 
has to bear its share of the environmental costs caused by the other three states anyway. There-
fore, it will also make use of its own industry and refer part of the costs of the use to the other 
three states. 
Table 1. Payoffs for Each State in Games dealing with Negative 
Externalities 
Number of other sta-
tes polluting 
0 1 2 3 
Pollute 2  1  0  -1 
Do not pollute  0  -1  -2  -3 
 
The most reasonable thing to do in such a situation seems to be to strike an agreement between 
all states concerned, prohibiting the use of contaminating industries. As the game is played re-
peatedly in reality, there is high likelihood that states will honor the agreement if they want the 
                                        
28   Seminally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Science 1243 (1968). 
29   Russell Hardin, Collective Action as an agreeable n-prisoners’ dilemma, 16 Behav. Sci. 472 (1971). As there 
are many forms of impure public goods, the incentive structure is not necessarily that of an n-dimensional 
prisoners’ dilemma: see Katharina Holzinger, Transnational Common Goods. Strategic Constellations, Col-
lective Action Problems, and Multi-Level Provisions 32 (2008). However, I will limit the analysis in this sec-
tion to situations involving prisoners’ dilemma situations, as this is the most important constellation.   7
other parties to the treaty to comply as well.
30 However, what do we do if there is no agreement? 
Let us assume that three states abstain from polluting the air with the expectation that the others 
act likewise, while one state continues to use its contaminating industry. Is this practice suffi-
cient to form a customary norm protecting the clean air? Would this norm be binding for the 
fourth state, or could the latter be qualified as a persistent objector? 
In the world of our model, it seems justified to recognize a customary norm and to extend its 
scope even to the fourth state although it has not consented. We cannot invoke the sovereignty 
principle in favor of the fourth state because its behavior has negative external effects. The exer-
cise of its freedom to pollute comes into conflict with the freedom of the other states to enjoy 
clean air. If we privileged the active freedom of the fourth state against the passive freedom of 
the other three states, we would privilege freedom of action in general against the passive free-
dom not to be harmed. However, there seems to be no plausible argument to favor one type of 
freedom over another. As the potential customary norm supports socially optimal behavior and 
prevents external effects, we do not have to require consensus for the formation of such a norm. 
Furthermore, the acceptance of persistent objectors in such situations would exactly contradict 
the rationale of this construct. While it is supposed to protect the freedom of states, its invocation 
in our case would exactly promote the violation of the freedom of the majority of states. 
In a second step, let us complicate our basic model. Up to now, we have assumed that payoffs 
are distributed equally across countries. However, this does not seem too realistic. There are 
some industrialized countries that benefit more from contaminating industries, while there are 
other countries which are affected more severely by certain environmental harm. We might 
think, for example, of an island state whose existence is endangered by the rising sea level which 
is caused by global warming. Moreover, let us assume that for the industrialized state the benefit 
of the use of its contaminating industries outweighs the environmental costs affecting its territory 
even if all other states make use of their contaminating industry. 
Now, the problem is not just one of finding a social optimum, as it was in the first step, but there 
are also significant distributive implications. The industrialized state does not have any incentive 
to enter into an agreement protecting the environment because even if everybody pollutes, the 
industrialized state is still better off than if it were totally prevented from producing. In contrast, 
the prohibition of environmental harm is crucial for the survival of the island state. It seems that 
in this case the arguments that have been presented above carry even more weight. The exercise 
of its freedom by the industrialized state severely impairs the freedom of the island state so that 
the industrialized state should be bound by an emerging customary norm even if it has not con-
sented to it. 
To complicate the matter further, let us assume in a third step that the private benefits of the in-
dustrialized state outweigh the total social costs that are caused by its industrial activity. We 
could, e.g., think of a conduct that produces a private benefit of five and social costs of four. 
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From an economic point of view, it now seems to be more problematic to prohibit the contami-
nating behavior. We still observe the external effect of the behavior that restricts the freedom of 
other states. However, the conduct is, in total, socially beneficial. The problem is only that the 
benefit is not distributed among those who bear the costs. In a world with clear property rights, 
the industrialized state would go ahead with its contaminating conduct and compensate the other 
states for their losses.
31 Because of the complexity of the involved distribution problem, simple 
majority rules, which provided some guidance in the other situations, do not seem to be the right 
solution in this case. We either have to recur to consensual solutions or trust courts to find an 
equitable balance. 
Furthermore, we would have a distribution problem of a different kind. Situations in which in-
dustrial production outweighs the harm that is caused by industrial pollution require a certain 
level of technological development. Technologically more developed industries will either be 
less contaminating or more productive than industries of less developed countries. This brings us 
to a well-known dilemma of international environmental law: if we impose the same standards 
on developing countries that we are imposing on developed countries, we might contribute to 
widening the developmental gap because less developed countries usually have less efficient 
technology.
32 One of the rationales of well-designed emission trading systems is to deal with 
these kinds of distributive issues.
33 Again, simple majority rules do not provide an adequate an-
swer to the social dilemma. 
Finally, we have an epistemological problem. In all of our model worlds, we have so far assumed 
that we have perfect information. We know the pay-offs of the games and can thus calculate the 
socially optimal solution. However, this assumption is not realistic. Most often states not only 
have different interests with regard to certain social problems; they will also disagree with regard 
to the underlying facts, the costs and benefits of a certain measure. We often do not know what 
the socially optimal solution of a cooperation problem is. If we knew, we would not need cus-
tomary international law, but could rely on the judgment of enlightened social engineers.
34 At 
least in cases without distributional problems, judges in international courts and tribunals could 
just impose the socially optimal solution on the parties. 
                                        
31   This is the conclusion of the Coase theorem, see Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & 
Econ. 1 (1960). 
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Paul G. Harris, Common But Differentiated Responsibility: The Kyoto Protocol and United States Policy, 7 
N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 27 (1999); Duncan French, Developing States and International Environmental Law: The 
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33   This is the rationale behind the Clean Development Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 12, March 16, 1998, 37 ILM 22 (1998) (entered into force 
Feb. 16, 2005). 
34   This is the rationale behind many natural law approaches to international law, see Fernando R. Tesón, The 
Kantian Theory of International Law, 92 Col. L. Rev. 53 (1992); Antônio Augusto Cançado Trindade, Inter-
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Relying on the opinions of states and state practice is thus an epistemological tool. The more 
states support a certain rule, the more probable it is that this rule constitutes a socially optimal 
solution. However, it is not possible to establish a specific quota of support that has to be met for 
the formation of a customary norm. One indication for the rationality of a specific customary 
rule may be that it is supported by a majority of states. As the support of the majority is no guar-
antee for the rationality of a decision, though, it is only an indication for rationality, without al-
ready being an expression of it.
35 Therefore, the more certain we can be about the social opti-
mum of a certain situation, the less consent we need to observe. If we can be fairly certain about 
the social optimum, the active support of a majority of states will be sufficient to establish a cus-
tomary norm. However, if there is a lot of uncertainty, we will need to require a higher quota of 
support. 
The same is valid with regard to the question whether we can allow for persistent objectors. In 
situations with a high amount of certainty, the objection to an emerging customary rule will, in 
most cases, follow strategic interests. As deviating conduct causes harm to the interests of the 
whole international community, persistent objection cannot be permitted. When we have identi-
fied a rule that protects a common good and we are fairly certain about the social optimum, then 
this rule is binding upon all states regardless of whether they have objected or not. The situation 
is different with regard to situations of high uncertainty. Here, we have to take into account that 
different societies have different risk preferences that have to be respected. Therefore, a persis-
tent objection should, in principle, be possible if a specific state evaluates a certain social dilem-
ma differently than does the majority of the international community. 
b.   Norms of coordination 
The second category in our taxonomy is norms of coordination. In game-theoretical terms, coor-
dination problems arise if a social problem has different equilibria on which states can focus. In 
such situations, the states have to focus on one equilibrium. The simplest coordination game is 
one which offers different options, and in which the states are indifferent with regard to which 
option to choose (table 2). 
Table 2. Simple Coordination Game 
 Left  Right 
Left  1, 1  -1, -1 
Right  -1, -1  1, 1 
 
                                        
35   There are several reasons why the majority opinion may not be irrational. First, even on the level of govern-
ments, irrational decisions may be taken because of a lack of information or competence. Second, sometimes 
short-term interests may deviate from the long-term interests of a state. If the former, therefore, trumps the 
latter, states make unsustainable decisions: see Fareed Zakaria, The Future of Freedom. Illiberal Democracy 
At Home and Abroad 168-169 (2003). Finally, governments may have incentives to make politics for certain 
particularistic interests to the detriment of the society as a whole: see Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective 
Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups 127-128 (1965).  10
The principal example for this type of situations is certain traffic rules. To an individual, it does 
not matter whether he drives on the left-hand side or the right-hand side of the street. What mat-
ters is that everybody drives on the same side of the street. Some rules of diplomatic communica-
tion may have such a character. It is not so important how it is done exactly, but it is important 
that there is some uniform way of dealing with these issues. The principal function of these 
norms is thus the protection of expectations.
36 In most countries, I drive on the right-hand side of 
the street because I can expect all others to drive there, too. 
These situations usually pose little problems for customary norms, as states have an incentive to 
act in the same way, anyway. If a state acts in a different way, this may be an indication that the 
costs for the particular behavior might be different than for all other states, e.g. because of a cer-
tain, countervailing cultural tradition. If the state is willing to bear the costs of his deviating be-
havior, international law should not prevent it from doing so. Therefore, in simple coordination 
situations, there is no reason not to permit persistent objection. Furthermore, if a state clearly 
protests against the formation of a certain rule, the other states know that the protester will react 
differently than everybody else. Consequently, if the principal aim of norms of coordination is 
the protection of expectations, there is no danger that they form false expectations about the con-
duct of the persistent objector. 
However, coordination games can also be more complicated and involve some distributive is-
sues. We can, for example, consider the battle of the sexes game (table 3). In the battle of the 
sexes game, a couple discusses how to spend a Saturday night. While he wants to see a play, she 
would much rather go to a baseball game. However, both prefer doing something together, rather 
than spending the evening apart. He is better off accompanying her to the baseball game than 
spending the evening alone in the theater. 
Table 3. Battle of the Sexes Game 
 Left  Right 
Left  2, 1  0, 0 
Right  0, 0  1, 2 
 
In this game, all parties thus also have an incentive to coordinate on a specific equilibrium. 
However, they do care which equilibrium to coordinate on, and they have competing interests in 
this respect. One example from international law is the rules with regard to the delimitation of 
the continental shelf. Here all parties agree that it is necessary to have a clear rule on this issue in 
order to have legal certainty. However, their interests may differ with regard to how the rule ex-
actly looks like. 
                                        
36   See Roger Guesnerie, The Government and Market Expectations, 157 J. Institutional & Theoretical Econ. 
116, 124 (2001).   11
In the Continental Shelf Case of the International Court of Justice, Denmark, Germany, and the 
Netherlands were arguing about the rule for the delimitation of their continental shelf.
37 Den-
mark and the Netherlands preferred the application of the equidistance principle, according to 
which all points of the continental shelf are attributed to the country to whose coast they are 
closest. However, the application of this principle is unfavorable for countries with a concave 
coastline, such as Germany. Consequently, Germany recognized the general utility of the equi-
distance principle, but claimed that states with a concave coastline should get a just and equitable 
share of the continental shelf, which takes into account the proportional length of their coastline. 
After negotiations failed, the three countries referred the case to the ICJ. 
That the countries referred the case to a court already shows that the preferred option was to have 
legal certainty concerning the shape of the delimitation, regardless of what the actual line would 
look like. However, they had divergent preferences with regard to the exact shape of the line. In 
such a case, consent requirements do not seem to be a solution. States prefer having a rule to not 
having any rule, and the courts do have to take a decision on what such a rule looks like, even 
though there is no consensus among the parties. Furthermore, simple majority rules do not help 
us either. The interests of a specific state in the continental shelf example depend on the natural 
environment of this state. If states with a concave coastline form a minority of all coastal states, 
then it is likely that their interests will not be taken into account if the majority of states coordi-
nate on the equidistance principle. However, this does not mean that their position should be dis-
regarded because it seems uniquely due to chance whether the majority favors one or the other 
rule. The application of the majority rule thus only has limited epistemic value in such cases.
38 
Although a majority of states seemed to prefer the equidistance rule in the Continental Shelf 
case, the court found that this rule was not opposable to Germany.
39 Hence, how do we have to 
decide such cases if non liquet is not a viable option? In practice, courts tend to apply principles 
of bilateral equity in such situations.
40 In our example, the Court refrained from imposing a con-
crete delimitation line upon the parties. Instead, it gave the parties some principles of orientation 
for the negotiation of the delimitation line. It expressly referred to principles of equity in this 
context
41 and asked the parties to take all relevant geographic circumstances into account.
42 If 
there were still overlapping parts on whose attribution the parties could not agree, these parts 
should be divided in equal portions.
43 
This determination of customary rules deviates from the classical focus on state practice and 
opinio iuris. Instead, it refers to equity and justice. The applied standards of equity are, in the 
end, left to the deciding judge or judicial body. These judges may sometimes be able to refer to 
                                        
37   North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 ICJ Rep. 3 (Feb. 20). 
38   On the general epistemic value of the majority rule, see David Estlund, Beyond Fairness and Deliberation: 
The Epistemic Dimension of Democratic Authority, in Deliberative Democracy 173 (James Bohman & Wil-
liam Rehg eds., 1997). 
39   North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 37, at § 82. 
40   Koskenniemi, supra note 3, at 461-473. 
41   North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 37, at §§ 85, 88. 
42   Id, at § 101. 
43   Id.  12
general, more abstract principles of international law, but even if such principles exist, the judge 
will still have a considerable margin of discretion. However, there is probably no better way to 
deal with these situations. In any case, what is most important to the parties is the existence of a 
clear rule, while the concrete shape of this rule is only of secondary importance. 
c.   Ethical values 
States are the primary legislators in international law. They have the power to conclude treaties, 
and it is their practice that determines the content of customary international law. However, not 
all norms of international law concern only the direct or indirect interest of states. There are also 
norms that concern the interests of other legal subjects. The primary example is the norms of 
international human rights law that are supposed to protect citizens against their state. The prob-
lem of these types of norms is that the citizens are not involved in the law-making process. The 
states themselves do decide about the limits of their power against their citizens. To a certain 
extent, they can thus conclude a contract to the benefit or the detriment of third persons, the indi-
viduals affected by their sovereign power. If a state does not ratify certain human-rights treaties 
and objects against the formation of customary norms that protect its citizens, the citizens cannot 
influence the international law-making process. 
In the legal order of most states, such contracts to the detriment of third persons are prohibited. 
In a domestic democracy, where decisions are taken against the interests of certain individuals, 
these individuals are at least indirectly involved in the decision-making process. However, such a 
participation of individuals seems practically unfeasible in international law.
44 There are two 
possible solutions to the problem that are proposed in the legal literature. On the one hand, 
scholars recur to natural law concepts.
45 They assume that it is possible to identify certain uni-
versal values that are valid for the whole of humankind and that bind every state of the interna-
tional community by means of proper reasoning. 
However, how do we determine these universal values? Different cultures and societies have 
different conceptions about what constitutes a good life. Some cultures champion individual 
rights, while others emphasize the value of the society and thus perceive obligations towards the 
society as a crucial element of social order. Even if it were possible, in theory, to determine cer-
tain universal values, we would need a person or a body that determines these universal values. 
However, nobody acts behind a veil of ignorance, but has a certain social and cultural imprint 
that would influence his judgment. Even if we think we know which values are universal, this 
judgment is certainly in some way influenced by our social and cultural heritage. Therefore, it 
                                        
44   But see recent accounts in favor of a cosmopolitan democracy: Jürgen Habermas, Kommunikative Rational-
ität und grenzüberschreitende Politik: eine Replik, in Anarchie der komunikativen Freiheit 406 (Peter Niesen 
& Benjamin Herborth eds., 2007); Daniele Archibugi, The Global Commonwealth of Citizens: Toward Cos-
mopolitan Democracy (2008). 
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seems impossible to determine natural law-like universal values that form part of customary in-
ternational law.
46 
On the other hand, we can think of a procedural way of involving the interests of individuals in 
the process of forming customary international law. One might think of considering only the 
practice of democratic states as relevant practice for the field of human rights law.
47 Then citi-
zens would at least indirectly be involved in the process of law-making, as they could, to a cer-
tain extent, influence the conduct of their states over democratic processes. However, this ap-
proach has one significant conceptual problem as well. It has a predisposition towards democra-
cy.
48 As only democracies participate in the game, it implies that democracy is the best 
government form for all states, all cultural environments, and all socio-economic circumstances. 
However, the political-science literature on democratization theory suggests that the effective-
ness of democracy depends on several preconditions—such as a certain level of socio-economic 
development, the dispersion of power resources, or social and cultural cohesion.
49 
We thus have a tension between the preservation of the cultural autonomy of each individual 
state and the protection of the citizens against exploitations in the name of cultural exceptional-
ism. The structure of the problem is a paradoxical one, so that there can be no clear-cut logical 
answer. However, I want to highlight two points that might help us to deal with this problem in 
the context of customary international law. 
First, conflicts about ethical values are often not so much about the general existence of these 
values, but more about the relationship between conflicting values. Nobody would deny that 
people have, in principle, a right to life or a right for the respect of their privacy. However, there 
may be considerable disagreement about the extent to which these rights can be restricted for 
social purposes or competing values. Rights can thus rarely be perceived as absolute and unlim-
ited.
50 Instead, we have to attribute a margin of discretion to states in solving these conflicts. In-
ternational courts can only control the limits of this margin of discretion, in particular whether 
there is a legitimate purpose for restricting an individual right and whether there has to be a plau-
sible relation between the pursuance of the aim and the restriction of a human right.
51 
But what about the recognition of the ethical values themselves? Do they only bind those states 
that have explicitly or implicitly accepted these values, or can a customary norm in this field also 
be binding on states that oppose the respective norm? Basically, persistent objection cannot be 
                                        
46   See Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice (2009), who stresses the impossibility of identifying one global just 
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permitted in cases of an ethical norm.
52 That would allow certain governments to oppose norma-
tive developments to the detriment of their population under the pretext of cultural exceptional-
ism. Cultural differences can be taken into account by attributing to them a margin of discretion 
with regard to the solution of conflicts between competing values. Governments can thus not 
oppose developments without giving reasons, but they have to justify if they want to restrict spe-
cific human rights. 
Conclusion 
The previous analysis illustrated that we should rethink our approach to consent in the formation 
of customary international law. There are normative reasons not to stick to one uniform ap-
proach, but to distinguish different social situations and different levels of uncertainty. This con-
tribution considered three such situations. First, there are rules with regard to the protection of 
common goods. In these cases, state consent is a mere epistemological tool. Therefore, states 
can, in principle, even be bound by a customary rule if they object to their emergence. Second, 
there are norms concerning cooperation games. In these cases, states can, in principle, only be 
bound by the norm if they have not objected to the norm. However, there are often cases in 
which it may be necessary for courts to recur to considerations of bilateral equity. Finally, we 
identified rules protecting ethical values. Basically, states only have a margin of discretion in 
balancing competing ethical values, but they cannot individually oppose the emergence of an 
ethical norm.  
The ideas highlighted in this contribution are certainly not exhaustive. There are still many issues 
that remain to be solved. In some cases, it may, e.g., be fairly clear which kind of social problem 
we face. In others, the detection of the incentive structure may be more difficult, so that we 
would have to determine how to proceed in such situations. Furthermore, there may be good rea-
sons to differentiate even more situations in the taxonomy. However, I hope that the contribution 
helps to draw the attention of the scholarly discussion to aspects that have so far been rather ne-
glected by the debate on customary international law. 
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